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Abstract: The comitology regime, the committee-based system developed as a 
mechanism for controlling the Commission’s exercise of its powers to implement EU 
measures, has been subject to severe criticism on grounds of lack of accountability 
and transparency.  The system has recently been fundamentally reformed by means 
of the new Implementing Acts Regulation, which came into force on 1st March 2011.  
This paper investigates whether the new rules are sufficient to remedy accountability 
deficits as regards implementing acts, and concludes as far as accountability to the 
Member States is concerned, their control powers have remained static.  
 
In addition, the new delegated acts procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
grants the European Parliament (EP) more control powers, although the EP’s gains 
are more modest than they might appear.  This change has come at the cost of 
reduced control powers for Member States as well as lowered standards of 
transparency for the public.  
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I Introduction 
 
This paper takes as its focal point problematic aspects of the procedures for 
adopting delegated and implementing acts, known pre Lisbon as the comitology 
regime, and now replaced by Articles 290 and 291 TFEU along with the new 
Implementing Acts Regulation.1 It was often alleged in some comitology literature 
that the comitology regime suffered from being insufficiently transparent and 
accountable.2  This paper first of all examines the meaning of accountability and its 
linkage to the field of comitology.  It then outlines the deficits of the pre-Lisbon 
comitology regime from the point of view of accountability, and examines in detail 
whether the framework incorporated by the Lisbon Treaty, as applied to date in 
practice, mitigates the accountability deficits inherent in the pre Lisbon comitology 
procedure. The paper contends that the latest developments regarding delegated 
and implementing acts are unlikely to remedy the accountability deficits inherent in 
this area.  More specifically, as regards implementing measures, accountability to 
the Member States remains the same, at least on a transitional basis, although the 
Council (as distinct from Member States) no longer has a significant role.  But there 
has been no improvement as regards transparency standards for the public.  As 
regards delegated acts, the EP has impressive control powers, at least in theory, 
although as compared to the previous Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS), 
the predecessor of the delegated acts process, in practice the EP’s gains are more 
modest than they might appear.  For the public, the development of the delegated 
acts process has actually worsened the standards of accountability. 
 
 
II The conceptual framework of European Union Accountability 
 
Assessing whether delegated and implementing acts suffer from accountability 
deficits, along with examining alternatives on how to mitigate these deficits, 
presupposes a clear understanding of the meaning of accountability.  This exercise 
in definition is more problematic than might at first be supposed.  This section 
therefore begins by explaining accountability in order to understand what is, and 
what is not, meant by this concept.  Secondly, it analyses the reasons why more 
accountability is being called for in the EU.  Lastly, the section examines the 
requirements of accountability with particular reference to the present level of 
accountability and transparency in the EU. By doing so, it attempts to build an 
appropriate foundation to be used as an essential tool for the analysis in the 
following sections.  
 
A Setting out the concept: Explanation of accountability  
 
                                                          
1
 Reg 182/2011, [2011] OJ L55/13.  
2
 G. Brandsma, ‘Accountability deficits in European “Comitology” Decision-making’, (2007) 11 
European Integration Online Papers; C. Neuhold, ‘Taming the “Trojan Horse” of Comitology? 
Accountability issues of Comitology and the Role of the European Parliament’, (2008) 12 European 
Integration Online Papers; G. Brandsma, D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘How Transparent are EU 
“Comitology” Committees in Practice?’, (2008) 14 European Law Journal 819. 
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Accountability is a term frequently used in EU documents: ‘we live in the age of 
accountability, wherever one looks there is a discussion and debate over 
accountability’ν 3 the word ‘crops up everywhere performing all manner of analytical 
and rhetorical tasks and carrying most of the burdens of democratic “governance”’.4  
The importance of accountability is highlighted in relation to almost every issue, from 
the provision of public services5 and criminal justice6 to transnational governance 
regimes.7  Indeed, in this new age of governance, accountability has come to stand 
as an essential feature, if not the most important feature, of any system of 
governance in which the exercise of public power has been extended beyond the 
boundaries of the nation state.  Such accountability has the ability to ensure that the 
different modes of governance are legitimate.  The reason for this is the existence of 
‘a common assumption that accountability is an autonomous and neutral feature of 
any governing system national or transnational’.8     
 
However, accountability is an important yet elusive term that bears different 
meanings, and its characteristics differ depending upon the context.  It is a broad 
concept that reflects a variety of understandings rather than a single paradigm9 and, 
in fact, in the literature there seem to be as many definitions of accountability as 
there are scholars.10  The relevant literature identifies distinct types of accountability, 
such as legal, democratic, financial, political, administrative and electoral.11  Also, 
commentators suggest that accountability can be internal, external or horizontal or 
vertical, formal or informal.12   
 
Historically, accountability is closely related to the term ‘to account’ in its literal sense 
of bookkeeping.13   Its origins can be found in an English idea emerging in the 
decades following the 1066 Norman Conquest, and more specifically from William I’s 
efforts to establish and legitimise his rule over England at the end of Henry II’s reign 
(1189).14  All property holders at this time were required to ‘render a count’ of what 
they possessed in the terms set by the King’s agents.  This term, however, has 
arrived in the literature, and particularly into the legal research, quite recently, and 
was not in common use outside the financial contexts of accountancy and auditing.15 
                                                          
3
 E. Fisher, ‘The EU in the Age of Accountability’, (2004) 24 Oxford of Journal Legal Studies 495, 495. 
4
 R. Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”μ an Ever-Expanding Concept?’, (2000) 78 Public Administration 555, 
555. 
5
 A. Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
6
 D. Roche, Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
7
 A-M. Slaughter, ‘The Accountability of Government Networks’, (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 347. 
8
 Fisher, op cit n 3 supra, at 496. 
9
 D. Curtin, and A. Nollkaemper, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability in International and European Law’, 
(2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3. 
10
 Brandsma, op cit n 2 supra, at 2. 
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 D. Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The Search for Accountability, Effectiveness and 
Citizenship (Open University Press, 1991). 
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 C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, (2000) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 38. 
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 E. Normanton, The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study (Manchester 
University Press, 1996). 
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 M. Dubnick, ‘Seeking Salvation For Accountability’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association (2002), Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & 
Hynes Convention Centre, Boston, Massachusetts. 
15
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The reason for this appears to be that ‘accountability is not a term for art for 
lawyers’.16  Lawyers have never had an exclusive right to use the term.17 Rather, 
lawyers rely on the classical vocabulary of the rule of law, liberty, democracy and 
respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.  Indeed, it is the rule of law that forms 
part of the constitutional law vocabulary, not the concept of accountability per se.  
 
B Reasons for accountability:  The core meaning of the term 
 
In the contemporary literature the term ‘has come to stand as a general term of any 
mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their particular publics’.18 
While citizens delegate power to their representatives, they have reasons to hold 
them accountable.  ‘[A]ccountability is a factor in legitimacy and one that begins to 
run neck and neck with representation’. 19   Accountability is meant to keep a 
democratic check upon actions of those exercising public power to ensure that the 
preferences of the voters are translated into policy.  It also ensures that the terms on 
which political power is authorised are duly observed.  It refers to the fact that 
decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to explain and justify 
their actions.20  There is, therefore, ‘an unquestionable thirst for accountability that 
cuts across the political spectrum’.21  Where public policy does not correspond to the 
ultimate preferences of the people, accountability mechanisms come into effect.  
 
In a concrete sense, there is a strong need for the public to know how public money 
is spent and to receive assurances that it has been well spent.22 This relates to the 
public interest in knowing how it is governed. 23   The executive of any public 
organisation has in its possession the taxpayers’ money. With the right to use that 
money on behalf of the public comes the obligation to use it wisely.  The executive 
must therefore be held accountable for doing so, and face the consequences if it 
does not.24  
 
A suitable definition of the term is provided by Bovens. Accountability is a 
‘relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgment, and the actor may face consequences’. 25   In other words, ‘A is 
accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and 
                                                          
16
 C. Harlow, C. ‘European Governance and Accountability’, in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds), 
Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Hart, 2003), at 79. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 R. Mulgan, Holding Power to Account, Accountability in Modern Democracies (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), at 8. 
19
 A. Benz, Y. Papadopoulos and C. Harlow ‘Special Issueμ Accountability in EU Multilevel 
Governance’, (2007) 13 European Law Journal, 441, 442. 
20
 C. Lord, Democracy in the European Union (Sheffield Academic Press, 1998). 
21
 M. Moore and M. Gates, Inspectors-General: Junkyard Dogs or Man's Best Friend? (Russel Sage 
Foundation, 1986), at 1. 
22
 M. Power, The Audit Society, Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
23 D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (Plume, 1992). 
24
 R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Brooking Institution Press, 2001). 
25
 M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountabilityμ A conceptual Framework’, (2007) 13 
European Law Journal 4, 447. 
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decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct’.26   
 
In its fundamental sense, therefore, accountability means being answerable for one’s 
actions to some authority and, if necessary, having to suffer sanctions for actions not 
in accordance with the mandate granted by that authority. In concrete terms, this 
form of accountability can be said to break down into four major elements: the setting 
of standards, the obtaining of an account, the judging of such an account and a 
decision about the consequences that arise from such a judgment.27     
 
C Requirements of Accountability 
 
The first feature of accountability is that there must be at least two different persons 
or bodies in an external relationship, in the sense that the account must be given to 
some other body or person outside the person or body being held accountable (the 
forum).  Also, there needs to be a social interaction and exchange between the one 
who calls for the account and the one who is being held accountable.  The former 
asks questions while trying to scrutinise the other party, whereas the latter answers 
and suffers the sanctions where necessary.  This definition of accountability 
combines justification by the accountability holdee to the accountability holder, with 
availability to the latter of applying sanctions vis-à-vis the former.28   
 
Another feature of accountability is reparation and/or effective redress.29  Put simply, 
there is a strong need to put matters right in the event of errors.  In fact, 
accountability, besides leaving the accountee liable for giving an explanation of 
actions and suffering the consequences for those actions where appropriate, entails 
that the accountee must, in addition, ‘undertake to put matters right if it should 
appear that errors have been made.  In other words it is explanatory and 
amendatory’. 30   This is in line with the argument that accountability operates 
prospectively and retrospectively and, as such, encompasses the ‘fire watching’ 
function of legislation and regulation.31  This statement brings into play the definition 
of control as ‘periodic checking and examination of the activities of public officials by 
external actors possessed of formal or constitutional authority to investigate, to grand 
quietus or to censure, and in some cases even to punish’.32 
 
However, accountability is often understood as a process that operates 
retrospectively in the sense that it involves giving an account of a prior conduct.  
Such views, however, have been challenged by approaches that see accountability 
                                                          
26
 A. Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in A. Schedler, The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), at 17.   
27
 Davies, op cit n 5 supra. 
28
 Schedler, op cit n 26 supra. 
29
 Davies, op cit n 5 supra. 
30
 D. Oliver, Government in the United Kingdom: The search for Accountability, Effectiveness, and 
Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 1991), at 24. 
31
 Brandsma, op cit n 2 supra. 
32
 C. Lord, ‘The Hidden Public Sectorμ The “Quangocratization” of the world’, in G. Kaufmann, G. 
Majone, and V. Ostrom, Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector (de Gruyter, 1986), at 
766. 
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as more of an on-going process.33  Though accountability has mainly to do with 
wrongdoing that has taken place in the past, the objectives of the accountability 
process are increasingly accompanied by more forward-looking methods.  These 
methods have more to do with ways to prevent failures from happening again. 
 
What can therefore be designated as the original or the core meaning of the term is 
the liability to give an account or explanation of actions and, where appropriate, to 
suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put matters right if it should 
appear that errors have been made.34  Decision-makers must be obliged to justify 
their actions and not be allowed to rely on claims that that their rightness is to be 
assumed.  It is crucial to have provisions for matters to be put right when things have 
gone wrong.  The emphasis on accountability can be either on ‘giving account’ or on 
‘holding to account’.35  The former concentrates on disclosing information and on 
justifying behaviour, leaving the possibility of sanction as an option and not the main 
focus of the concept.  The latter not only entails the obligation to disclose information 
and to justify actions, but also, and more importantly, that the actors should be in a 
relationship with another forum which has the power to impose sanctions and to give 
rewards.36   
 
D  Accountability in the EU 
 
In the context of the EU, the need for accountability is augmented by the ‘democratic 
deficit’ which some have argued exists within the EU at various levels.37 Members of 
the EU institutions, offices, bodies and agencies - with the notable exception of the 
EP- are not elected directly by the people and can removed from their positions only 
in the most extreme circumstances.  While accountability within the EU context is 
often characterised as a principle for an era of innovative governance, a common 
statement by many commentators is that, not only is the EU not accountable enough 
but that accountability deficits are even growing, compromising the legitimacy of the 
EU.38   
 
EU debates about the accountability of political systems therefore reveal concerns 
over how to make decision-making more democratic and legitimate and to ensure 
that delegated power is controlled.  In the case of the EU, the above-mentioned 
notion of democratic accountability, in the sense of a process by which the 
government has to present itself for re-election, does not exist.  Indeed, at the EU 
level governments are not elected.   
 
There is an argument that the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ is exaggerated, because the 
EU is not responsible for many of the issues of key concern to citizens such as 
                                                          
33
 J.M. Moncrieffe, ‘Accountabilityμ Ideals, Ideas, Constraints’, (2001) 8 Democratization 26. 
34
 Oliver, op cit n 30 supra. 
35
 R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, (2005) 99 
American Political Science Review 29; Mulgan, op cit n 4 supra; Harlow, op cit n 16 supra; Oliver, op 
cit n 30 supra; Scott, op cit n 12 supra. 
36
 Mulgan, op cit n 4 supra. 
37
 Curtin, op cit n 9 supra; Brandsma, op cit n 2 supra; Neuhold, op cit n 2 supra. 
38
 M. Bovens, D. Curtin and P. Hart, The Real World of EU Accountability, What Deficit? (Oxford 
University Press, 2010)ν A. Arnull, ‘Introductionμ The EU’s Accountability and Legitimacy Deficit’, in A. 
Arnull and D. Wincott, Accountability and Legitimacy in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
7 
 
taxation, health care and pensions, and is in any event more accountable than other 
international institutions or processes.39  Nevertheless, while it might reasonably be 
argued that it is not necessary that the end of political accountability at the EU level 
is to have an elected government, it is still necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability for the EU, given that it has developed into 
a political union with policies stretching far beyond the original aims of eliminating 
barriers to cross border economic activities, for example in fields such as consumer 
protection, occupational health and safety and environmental policy, and having a 
greater public impact than other forms of interaction between States.  There has long 
been a concern that the trend toward forceful EU policy making is not being matched 
by an equally forceful move to create appropriate accountability regimes. 40  
Furthermore, the fall of the Santer Commission in 1999, against a background of 
allegations of fraud, maladministration and chronic mismanagement, had the effect 
of firmly placing accountability on the political agenda of EU institutions.   
 
E  Accountability and Transparency 
 
Accountability’s alter ego, transparency, requires decision-makers to give 
explanations for the decisions they have made.  It ‘ensures that decisions are taken 
out of the “backroom”’, 41 allowing firmer supervision of the exercise of delegated 
power and thus resulting in more appropriate decisions and more accountable 
decision-makers.  As such, transparency is considered essential to any democratic 
polity.42  Transparency also serves as a crucial tool for understanding the reasons 
behind governmental action.  When a government justifies its decisions it facilitates 
construction of a reasoned argument by those opposed to the measure. 43  
Consequently, transparency is essential for holding a government accountable for its 
actions.  This can happen only when individual citizens are granted access to the 
relevant information enabling them to monitor the actions of a government.     
 
Also, transparency can only be meaningful when enforcement mechanisms are 
attached to it.44  It should not based on the notion that it can be satisfied simply by 
allowing citizens to see what is going on within the public institutions, fostering a 
form of belonging.   
 
Therefore an effective and independent judicial system is also ‘a fundamental 
prerequisite for effective executive accountability’45  ‘No society can be considered 
                                                          
39
 For a recent summary of this argument with further references, see P. Craig, ‘Integration, 
Democracy and Legitimacy’, in P. Craig and G. De Burca, eds, The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), at 14.  Similarly, accountability to the public and the EP must be 
secured regardless of whether comitology is conceived as a system of intergovernmental bargaining, 
deliberative supranationalism, or both: see, with further references, J. Blom-Hansen and G Brandsma, 
‘The EU Comitology Systemμ Intergovernmental Bargaining and Deliberative Supranationalism?’, 
(2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 719. 
40
 P. Schmitter, How to Democratize the EU … And Why Bother? (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
41
 Fisher, op cit n 3 supra at 503. 
42
 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 359. 
43
 Fisher, op cit n 3 supra. 
44
 A. Frost, A. ‘Restoring Faith in Governmentμ Transparency Reform in the United States and the 
EU’, (2003) 9 European Public Law 87. 
45
 Mulgan, op cit n 18 supra at 76. 
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truly democratic if its citizens are denied the possibility of vindicating their legal rights 
in judicial proceedings, whether against the oppressive acts of a powerful legislature 
- even a democratically elected one – or against the unlawful practices of an 
overweening administration’. 46   The EU Courts play a crucial role in public 
accountability.  They contribute to transparency through bringing cases to public 
attention.  It has been noted that: 
 
The fact that the citizens are aware of what the administration is doing is a guarantee 
that it will operate properly.  Supervision by those who confer legitimacy on the public 
authorities encourages them to be effective in adhering to their [citizens’] initial will and 
can thereby inspire their confidence, which is a guarantee of public content as well as 
the proper functioning of the democratic system.47 
 
So accountability of the EU can only be properly understood through the lens of the 
access to documents rules.  The public’s right to hold decision-makers into account, 
by assessing the impact of the activities of the EU and by commenting upon those 
activities, can obviously be exercised if there are rules in place which allow people to 
access the relevant information.  ‘After all, without information on what decisions are 
being taken and by whom, it will not be possible for various accountability forums to 
hold actors to account’.48  Transparency and openness enhance awareness and 
understanding of the ultimate objectives that the decision-making processes aim to 
achieve.49  ‘Without maximum access to government information, citizens have no 
way effectively to evaluate and monitor the process by which laws and policies get 
made and enforced’.50  In the words of the judiciary, ‘the widest possible access to 
documents … is essential to enable citizens to carry out genuine and efficient 
monitoring of the exercise of the powers vested in the [Union] institutions…’.51  This 
concept is now set out in the second recital in the preamble of Regulation 1049/2001 
on public access to documents held by the EP, the Council and the Commission,52 
which states that ‘openness … guarantees that the administration enjoys greater 
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic 
system’.   Consequently, access to documents rules are used to assess the EU’s 
legitimacy and as a means for strengthening accountability.   
 
The application of such rules to the comitology regime was first confirmed by the 
judgment in Rothmans,53 in which the Court of First Instance, now the General Court, 
ruled that the ‘authorship rule’ which applied to the access to documents rules prior 
to 200154 was a restriction on the right of access to documents and so had to be 
interpreted and applied strictly.  Thus, for the purposes of the access rules and by 
applying the general principle of the widest possible access to documents the Court 
                                                          
46
 F. Mancini and D. Keeling, ‘Democracy and the European Court of Justice’, (1994) 57 Modern Law 
Review, 175,181.  
47
 Case C-353/99P, Hautala v Council [2001] ECR I-9565, Opinion of Advocate-General Leger, para. 
52. 
48
 Brandsma et al., op cit n 2 supra at 819. 
49
 I. Harden, ‘Citizenship and Information’, (2001) 7 European Public Law 165. 
50
 S. Kierkegaard, ‘Open Access to public documents – More secrecy, less transparency!’, (2009) 25 
Computer Law & Society Report 3, 4. 
51
 Case T-92/98, Interporc v. Commission [1999] ECR II–3521, para. 39. 
52
 Reg 1049/2001, [2001] OJ L145/43.  
53
 Case T-188/97, Rothmans v Commission [1999] ECR II-2463. 
54
 Code of conduct, [1993] OJ L340/41, adopted by Commission Decision 94/90, [1994] OJ L46/58. 
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of First Instance ruled that comitology committees are part of the Commission and 
not separate entities.  This judgment was confirmed by the 1999 comitology 
decision.55  
 
 
III The Pre Lisbon Regime of Comitology Committees: The rationale for their   
development  
 
A Background 
 
From the very beginning (1960), the Council, the only legislator at that time, lacked 
extensive, detailed knowledge and the technical and scientific expertise required for 
the implementation of legislative measures.  It was also not possible for the Council 
to agree quickly and efficiently on all the technical requirements needed for every 
single piece of legislation due to workload limitation.56  Delegation to the Commission 
of the non-essential elements of legislation was seen as a solution to mitigate these 
problems.  However, delegation of the principal (in this case the Council) to the 
agent (in this case the Commission) can only be said to be desirable as long as the 
principal retains control powers to monitor how the agent is carrying out its delegated 
tasks.57  Loss of power by the Council is therefore a sufficient reason to consider 
delegation as undesirable.58  
 
The Council, by definition an intergovernmental institution, feared that delegation 
would see the supranational Commission acting contrary to the interests of the 
Member States when exercising its delegated implementing powers.  The Council, 
therefore, wished to exercise effective control over the Commission to limit, as far as 
possible, the Commission’s discretionary powers in the field and ensure that the 
implementing measures reflected the opinions of the Member States’ experts.59  It 
was therefore consideration of the Member States’ interests via the route of expert 
advice that led to the birth of the comitology committees.  The committees consisted 
of Member States’ representatives with a certain expertise tasked with assisting and 
controlling the Commission in the exercise of the implementing powers delegated to 
it by the Council.60  
 
Developed by necessity 61  and ‘spread like wildfire’62  the first type of comitology 
committees came into existence in the areas of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
                                                          
55
 See further III.C infra. 
56
 C. Bergstrom, Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
57
 Bovens, op cit n 25 supra. 
58
 A. Türk, ‘Transparency and comitology’, in C. Demmke and C. Engel, Continuity and Change in the 
European Integration Process (European Institute of Public Administration, 2003). 
59
 C. Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
60
 Assistance and control are, however, by definition contradictory and the whole idea of helping and 
controlling may thus be counterintuitive.   
61
 It should be noted that the Treaties do not provide for the creation of specific comitology 
committees (as distinct for the adoption of general rules governing those committees).  Each 
committee is established by secondary legislation on an ad hoc basis. 
62
 B. Driessen, ‘Delegated legislation after the Treaty of Lisbonμ An analysis of Article 290 TFEU’, 
(2010) 35 European Law Review 837, 838. 
10 
 
Common Commercial Policy, areas where highly detailed and up to date scientific 
and technical knowledge is needed most.63   
 
The comitology system was eventually provided for in Article 145 EEC/EC, as 
inserted by the Single European Act, and subsequently renumbered Article 202 EC 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  Article 202 EC provided that: 
 
The Council shall confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, 
powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down.  The Council 
may impose certain requirements (emphasis added) in respect of the exercise of 
these powers.  The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise 
directly implementing powers itself.  The procedures referred to above must be 
consonant with principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the 
European Parliament.   
 
The general ‘principles and rules’ referred to were set out initially in a Council 
Decision of 1987,64 which was replaced in 1999.65  The 1999 Decision was amended 
in 2006. 66  Pursuant to these rules, the Commission has been assisted and 
simultaneously controlled by the comitology committees.  These committees 
therefore constitute a cardinal tool of EU governance as they are highly involved in 
the implementation of EU legislation. During 2009, 266 comitology committees met 
894 times and voted 2,091 times. 67   The extent, therefore, to which these 
committees function as a mechanism of oversight on the Commission’s work 
illustrates the pressing need to ensure that they are subject to adequate 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
B  Accountability deficits of the Comitology Regime highlighted  
 
The EU is continually accused of being not accountable enough.68  This criticism was 
particularly applied to comitology committees prior to the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.69   
 
The development of comitology committees faced severe criticism70 and led to a 
number of long-standing inter-institutional tensions.  It would go beyond the scope of 
                                                          
63
 Bergstrom, op cit n 56 supra. 
64
 Council Decision 87/373/EEC, [1987] OJ L197/33. 
65
 Council Decision 1999/468/EC, [1999] OJ L184/23. 
66
 Council Decision 2006/512/EC, [2006] OJ L200/11. On the development of the comitology rules, 
seeμ W. Wessels, ‘Comitologyμ fusion in action. Politico-administrative trends in the EU system’, 
(1998) 5 Journal of European Public Policy, 209; C. Joerges and E. Vos, EU Committees: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart, 1999)ν C. Joerges and J. Neyer, ‘Transforming Strategic 
interaction into deliberative problem-solvingμ European Comitology in the Food stuff sector’, (1997) 4 
Journal of European Public Policy, 609ν E. Vos, ‘The rise of Committees’, (1997) 3 European Law 
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69
 Brandsma, op cit n 2 supra; Neuhold, op cit n 2 supra. 
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this paper to examine in detail the shortcomings of each of the Comitology 
Decisions.  Suffice to say here that the first Comitology Decision in 198771 provided 
with complex procedures (seven in number) that the Commission had to follow 
before the adoption of the delegated implementing measures.  The first Comitology 
Decision provided no further guidance as to which procedure should apply in each 
case.  More importantly, it granted the Member States through the Council a 
dominant role and completely ignored the EP, leaving it outside of the established 
‘control system’.  The EP, occupying the opposition side, feared 72  that already 
adopted legislative measures might be manipulated significantly in the 
implementation process without its involvement.   
 
The exclusion of the EP from the control mechanisms of the comitology committees 
when general rules on such mechanisms were first adopted led the EP to bring 
annulment proceedings before the Court of Justice against the first comitology 
decision on grounds of alleged accountability deficits.73   The pressing need for the 
EP to be on an equal footing with the Council became more obvious post Maastricht 
with the development of the co-decision procedure which placed the EP on a similar 
position as the Council and left its control powers relating to implementing measures 
with no change.  The EP considered that the Commission should not possess the 
power to amend or supplement a legislative act without the assent (tacit or explicit) 
of the legislator.  However, the Court of Justice subsequently implicitly confirmed that 
the general comitology rules also applied to acts adopted by co-decision.74   
 
The EP has consistently fought for increased control powers over the comitology 
committees, which it saw as a strategy of the Council to devalue the increased 
legislative powers of the EP.  The latter saw comitology as a way to manipulate 
significantly the implementation of measures already adopted under the (then) co-
decision procedure, something which was affecting the accountability of the EP: 
MEPs could no longer be held accountable if the measures decided by them were 
significantly changed in the implementation process.  In addition, such manipulation 
was affecting the ability of the EP to hold the executive to account because the 
implementing measures were de facto being taken by the committees.75   
 
The pressure from the EP was reflected in the first reform of the Comitology Decision 
in 1999,76 which enhanced the position of the EP and also simplified and reduced the 
comitology procedures from seven to four.77  This Decision in particular granted the 
EP the right to be informed of agendas, voting results and draft measures (where the 
basic act was adopted pursuant to the co-decision procedure), and to view summary 
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 Türk, op cit n 58 supra. 
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 Council Decision, op cit n 64 supra. 
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European Union (European Institute of Public Administration, 2009). 
73
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 Neuhold, op cit n 2 supra. 
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records and attendance lists of the comitology committees.78  The EP was also given 
the power to adopt ultra vires resolutions indicating that the Commission had 
exceeded its implementing powers foreseen in the basic act (if that act was adopted 
by means of the co-decision procedure).79  This type of soft control is closely related 
to the principle of the institutional balance provided by the Treaties and is upheld by 
a consistent line of case law.80 
 
According to the management procedure (Article 4) the Commission could adopt the 
implementing measures which would apply immediately, but if the opinion of the 
committee was negative (a qualified majority vote (QMV) of the Member States’ 
representatives against the proposal was required to block it) then the Council was 
entitled to take a different decision within a period of up to three months, which was 
set by each basic act.  The regulatory procedure (Article 5) was based on the idea 
that the committee needed to approve the draft measure before the Commission 
could adopt it, thus a QMV of the representatives in favour of the measure was 
necessary.  If the committee blocked a draft measure, it had to be forwarded to the 
Council, which had the chance to adopt or oppose it by a QMV.  If the Council failed 
to do either within the specified period, then the Commission had to adopt the 
measure.  But the EP had no role in such cases.  There was also a safeguard 
procedure (Article 6), which required the Commission to inform the Member States 
and the Council of the draft measures.  A Member State then could refer the draft 
decision to the Council, which could control the decision-making of the Commission 
by blocking or approving it, or taking a different decision by QMV. 
 
The Commission argued for abolishing comitology committees because the 
management and regulatory committees could prevent it from adopting implementing 
measures without the committee’s approval.81   It proposed as a replacement ‘a 
simple legal mechanism [which] allows Council and European Parliament as the 
legislature to monitor and control the actions of the Commission against the 
principles and political guidelines adopted in the legislation’.82 
 
The EP pressed for further reforms, as it still considered that an act adopted under 
the co-decision procedure (as it was then) which provided for the comitology 
procedure should provide for control to be exercised by both arms of the legislator 
equally.  Addressing these objections, the 2006 amendments to the Comitology 
Decision83 granted more control powers to the EP by introducing the RPS, which 
reflected its powers as a co-legislator by giving it the power to call back 
implementing measures.  More specifically, the 2006 Decision provides that where 
the basic act in question was adopted under the co-decision procedure and called for 
the adoption of a measure of ‘general application, designed to amend non-essential 
elements of that instrument, inter alia by deleting some of those elements or by 
                                                          
78
 Art 7(3), op cit n 65 supra.  The EP also had to be informed when the Commission proposed 
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 Arts 5(5) and 8, op cit n 65 supra. 
80
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supplementing the instrument by the addition of new non-essential elements’, the 
new regulatory procedure with scrutiny would apply.84   
 
Under this procedure, the Commission must submit a draft measure to a 
Committee.85  If the Committee supports the proposal by QMV, then it is forwarded 
to the Council and the EP and they both have 3 months to decide on adoption of the 
measure.  After the expiry of the 3 month period the Commission can proceed with 
adoption.86 Under the RPS the EP and/or the Council has the power to block the 
draft measure when certain conditions are met: when the draft measure exceeds the 
implementing powers provided in the basic act; when the draft measure is not 
compatible with the general aim or the content of the basic act; and finally, when the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are being violated.  If the measure is 
blocked by either the EP or the Council (or both), the Commission may resubmit an 
amended draft of the implementing measure to the committee, or present a 
legislative proposal.   
 
In cases where a committee gave a negative or no opinion, the draft measure is 
forwarded to the Council.87  The Council then has three options: to adopt, to oppose 
or take no action in relation to the measures concerned; it is not limited to opposing 
the measure only on certain substantive grounds.  If the Council votes against the 
measure by QMV, then it cannot be adopted; If the Council decides to adopt the draft 
measure by QMV, then the measure is forwarded to the EP; if the Council does not 
act (ie because there is no QMV for or against the measure), then the Commission 
must forward the draft measure to the EP.  In the latter two cases, the EP can then 
reject the measure by a majority of its members, on the same grounds set out above.  
Thus, if the Commission does not have the support of the comitology committee, the 
issue is referred first to the Council but the EP still has the power to block it.   
 
There was also a possibility for an urgent version of the RPS, which provided for the 
Commission to adopt a measure immediately, with a short period for the Council or 
EP to veto the measure concerned on the grounds that it was ultra vires, et al.  In 
that case, the Commission would have to repeal the measure concerned, although it 
could ‘provisionally maintain the measures in force if warranted on health protection, 
safety or environmental grounds’.88  
 
Since the introduction of the RPS in 2006, the Commission examined all the basic 
acts adopted under the co-decision procedure in order to apply the RPS to the 
existing acquis communautaire.  The adaptation process was completed by 2009.89  
In practice, interestingly enough the first veto under the RPS was exercised by the 
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Council when it objected to six draft measures that had been agreed by the 
comitology committees.90  For its part, the EP has blocked draft measures under the 
RPS in the areas of financial services91 and energy labelling.92 Also, the EP has 
brought a case against the Council, arguing that one adopted measure is ultra vires 
the basic act.93   
 
C Lifting the veil of secrecy: Accountability of Comitology procedures to the public 
 
Apart from the accountability deficits described above resulting from the exclusion of 
the EP from the control mechanisms of the implementing measures, other than the 
RPS procedure, comitology committees’ meetings were (and still are) taking place 
behind closed doors.  A select committee of the House of Lords reported that these 
committees were unknown since no list of such committees was ‘publicly available, 
nor is there an authoritative account of what each does’.94   
 
Furthermore, prior to 1999 freedom of information rules were simply non-existent as 
regards comitology committees, something which greatly affected accountability to 
the general public.  However, as noted above, in 1999 the Court of First Instance 
confirmed that the 1993 rules on access to documents applied to those 
committees,95 and the application of the access to documents rules was confirmed 
by the 1999 Comitology Decision.96  Therefore the public can have access to all the 
comitology documents unless any of the exceptions provided in the access to 
documents Regulation applies.97  Moreover, since 2000 the Commission publishes 
an annual report containing information on the number of such committees, their 
meetings and voting procedures, and since 2001, an online comitology register is 
also available.98   
 
However, empirical research carried out during 2005 indicates that comitology 
committees are not very transparent in practice. The research findings revealed that 
65% of the agendas, 54% of the membership lists, 67% of the summary records and 
87% of the voting records were available through the public register.  Overall only 
5.5% of the draft measures could be accessed.99  
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As for judicial review as regards comitology documents, the Court of First Instance 
(as it was then) ruled in British American Tobacco100 that the applicant’s interest in 
obtaining comitology documents outweighed the Commission’s own interest in 
safeguarding the confidentiality of its proceedings.  The latter rule was later replaced 
by an exception where giving access to documents would ‘seriously undermine’ a  
‘decision-making’ process, but the Court ruled that if the Commission seeks to rely 
on this exception as regards comitology documents, it must show that there was a 
real risk, which was reasonably foreseeable and not hypothetical, that outside 
pressure would seriously undermine the effectiveness of its discussions; the 
preparatory or informal nature of its work were not as such grounds to refuse 
access.101  Equally, documents concerning the views expressed in the comitology 
process must be disclosed even despite experts’ desire to hide their identities, and 
even if they concern scientific advice.102  
 
IV The Post Lisbon regime 
 
A Overview  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon provided for a change to the previous comitology system, 
entailing the creation of a new type of measure (delegated acts) as well as revising 
the Treaty framework regarding implementing measures.  The relevant provisions 
are Articles 290 TFEU (delegated acts) and Article 291 TFEU (implementing acts), 
which provide as follows:  
 
Article 290 
 
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative 
acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of 
the legislative act. 
 
The objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be 
reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation 
of power. 
 
2. Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the delegation is 
subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
 
(a) the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by 
the European Parliament or the Council within a period set by the legislative act. 
 
For the purposes of (a) and (b), the European Parliament shall act by a majority of its 
component members, and the Council by a qualified majority. 
 
                                                          
100
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3. The adjective ‘delegated’ shall be inserted in the title of delegated acts. 
 
Article 291 
 
1. Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement 
legally binding Union acts. 
 
2. Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, 
those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified 
specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on the Council. 
 
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay 
down in advance the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control 
by Member States of the Commission's 
exercise of implementing powers. 
 
4. The word ‘implementing’ shall be inserted in the title of implementing acts. 
 
The crucial issue is whether, following the Lisbon Treaty, EU citizens, along with 
their elected representatives (Members of the EP), the Council and the Member 
States, taken together, can exercise sufficient ex ante and ex post control over the 
delegated and implementing acts entrusted  to the Commission (and, where 
relevant, the Council).103  The following overview examines in turn the basic features 
of the post-Lisbon system and addresses some of the key legal issues which arise 
from it. Then the subsequent sub-sections look in greater detail at the application of 
the delegated acts procedure in practice and at the implications of the new general 
rules on implementing measures.    
 
First of all, it should be noted that the power to adopt delegated acts can only be 
conferred on the Commission, whereas it is still possible to confer implementing 
powers upon the Council in ‘duly justified specific cases’.104  
 
Secondly, these rules are explicitly (as regards implementing measures) and 
implicitly (as regards delegated acts) inapplicable to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP).105 
 
Thirdly, the circumstances in which the delegated acts procedure applies are very 
similar to the circumstances where the regulatory procedure with scrutiny applied 
under the pre-Lisbon rules, except that the delegated acts procedure can apply as 
regards the implementation of any legislative acts.  This means that delegation can 
take place not only where an act is adopted pursuant to the ordinary legislative 
procedure (the former co-decision procedure), but also where an act is adopted 
                                                          
103
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pursuant to a special legislative procedure.106  This interpretation follows from the 
ordinary wording of the Treaty Article,107 a fortiori by comparison with the text of the 
2006 amendment to the comitology rules,108 and a contrario by comparison with 
Article 218(6)(v) TFEU, which makes a distinction between the two types of 
procedure.109  
 
Fourthly, the scope of application of Article 291 is different from the scope of the 
prior Article 202 EC: the newer provision does not apply to all cases of 
‘implementation’ of measures which the Council adopts, but rather applies where 
‘uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts’ are needed.  Unlike 
Article 290, Article 291 is not restricted to measures implementing legislative acts.  
 
Fifthly, Article 290 does not call for the adoption of general rules required for its 
implementation; instead it provides that that the objectives, content, scope and 
duration of the delegation shall be defined in the legislative act and these conditions 
will be defined on an ad hoc basis.  On the other hand Article 291 calls for the 
adoption of a general legal framework governing the adoption of implementing acts. 
 
There are several key issues which arise regarding the scope of application of these 
Articles.  First of all, the Commission has rightly argued that these two provisions are 
mutually exclusive.110  This follows from the context of Article 290, which deals with 
cases where the legislators would ordinarily exercise legislative powers, ie where 
legislative acts are amended or supplemented.  It also explains the reference in 
Article 290 to control by the Council and EP (ie the legislators) as regards delegated 
acts, as compared to the reference in Article 291 TFEU to control by Member States 
(who similarly normally have the power to adopt measures implementing EU acts, 
according to Article 291(1)) as regards implementing measures.  In the former case, 
the legislators need to retain control of the (potentially) legislative powers they have 
delegated to the Commission, including the right to take those powers back when 
necessary, while in the latter case the Member States have a comparable need for 
control over measures which interfere with their usual competence over 
implementing EU law.  Presumably, where the power to adopt implementing acts has 
been conferred exceptionally on the Council, Member States will (as before) control 
the Council’s use of those powers in their capacity as members of the Council.  
 
Secondly, it follows from the first point that only the Council and EP can exercise 
control over delegated acts, while only Member States can exercise control over 
implementing measures. Logically, the body which normally holds the power in 
                                                          
106
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question is the only body which should exercise control over its delegation.  This is 
consistent with the interpretation of these provisions by the institutions in practice.111  
The consequence is that the Commission cannot be controlled by the Member 
States as regards delegated acts, or by the Council as regards implementing 
measures.  These are significant changes compared to the previous comitology 
rules, and alter our understanding of accountability as regards these measures.  
 
These fundamental distinctions between Articles 290 and 291, coupled with the 
mutually exclusive nature of these provisions and the lack of precision as regards 
their exact scope, means that there are likely to be difficult disputes between the EU 
institutions on the dividing line between them.112  
 
Thirdly, it follows from the first two points, in conjunction with the overlap between 
the scope of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny and the delegated acts 
procedure, that acts adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon cannot 
provide for the former procedure, but only for the latter.113  On the other hand, the 
RPS procedure remains valid to the extent that it is provided for in measures 
adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, because Article 290 
TFEU provides for the delegated acts procedure to apply only when a legislative act 
expressly provides for that procedure.  
 
Fourthly, as noted already, the delegated acts procedure applies regardless of the 
legislative procedure used to adopt a basic legislative act, as compared to the RPS 
system, which only applied where the basic act was adopted by means of the co-
decision procedure.  So it follows that the delegated acts procedure now applies in 
many places where the regulatory procedure without scrutiny previously applied.  In 
particular, the delegated acts procedure now applies in place of the ‘ordinary’ 
procedures in the previous comitology rules where (a) the former co-decision 
procedure did not apply and (b) the measures to be adopted are of ‘general 
application’ and ‘supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of [a] 
legislative act.’   
 
However, as regards the European Parliament, the scope of this change is less 
dramatic than it first appears, since the scope of the co-decision procedure, now 
known as the ordinary legislative procedure, was considerably extended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, for example to cover areas such as agriculture and fisheries (Article 
43(2) TFEU) and the common commercial policy (Article 207 TFEU).  So the RPS 
process would in any event have been extended to such areas, even if the delegated 
acts procedure had not been invented.   
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On the other hand, the delegated acts procedure is wider in scope than the RPS to 
the extent that the new procedure applies to areas that still fall within the scope of 
special legislative procedures. But, as discussed below, in practice the EP will not be 
granted control powers over the delegation in such cases.  
 
The new procedure also applies where the Council had previously delegated to itself 
the power to adopt measures which are of ‘general application’ and ‘supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of [a] legislative act’.  Again, this change is 
not as significant as it first appears, since delegation to the Council was the 
exception under the comitology rules, and in particular, the EP rarely (if ever) 
accepted the Council’s delegation of implementing powers to itself as regards 
legislation adopted by means of the co-decision procedure. 
 
Having said that, the move to the delegated acts procedure fundamentally alters the 
control powers of Member States, both de jure and de facto.  As noted already, 
Member States have lost all de jure power as compared to the previous rules, since 
they cannot as such control delegated acts.  They have also lost considerable de 
facto power, since the usual requirement under the previous rules that such 
measures had to be supported by a QMV of Member States’ representatives in a 
comitology committee has gone, leaving only the power of the Council, made up of 
Member States’ representatives, to block a proposed delegated act by QMV. 
 
Fifthly, it is necessary, in order to ensure that legislative acts are not amended 
without control of the legislature, to amend all relevant pre-Lisbon measures so that 
the new rules can apply.  To this end, the Commission has stated that all pre-Lisbon 
legislation providing for the RPS will be converted to the delegated acts procedure 
by the end of the current EP term (June 2014).114  Furthermore, the Commission 
also provided an indicative calendar listing its planned proposals to convert other 
pre-Lisbon legislative measures which provide for the adoption of implementing 
measures to the delegated acts procedure.115  A number of these proposals have 
already been submitted,116 including a proposal regarding the common commercial 
policy that would bring most legislation in this area within the scope of the general 
rules on implementing acts for the first time, removing the Council’s powers to adopt 
trade defence measures or to overrule the Commission, and leaving such powers 
with the Commission only.117  
 
For the time being, the pre-Lisbon comitology provisions have been converted to the 
regime of the new Implementing Acts Regulation, except for those cases where the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny applies;118 in those cases, RPS will apply until it is 
replaced by the delegated acts procedure.119  To the extent that the procedures 
concerned now fall within the scope of the delegated acts rules, this is surely illegal, 
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because, for the reasons discussed above, legislation adopted after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon must provide for the adoption of delegated acts, not 
implementing acts, where the acts concerned fall within the scope of Article 290.  
 
Next, an important question as regards Article 290 TFEU is whether the possibilities 
for control of the Commission listed in that Article are exhaustive or not.120  On this 
point, when the Treaty states that the power to adopt delegated acts ‘may’ be 
conferred on the Commission, it presumably means, in light of the general context of 
Article 290 (as discussed above), that the legislators have an option to confer this 
power upon the Commission; they could instead have fully retained the power to 
adopt such measures themselves pursuant to the legislative procedure.  Next, the 
Treaty requires (‘shall’) the objectives, et al of the delegation to be specified, and 
equally rules out the delegation of essential elements of the legislation.  The 
legislation ‘shall’ lay down the conditions to which the delegation is subject, but these 
conditions ‘may’ be revocation or prior control before adoption of a delegated act.   
 
The obvious meaning of the word ‘may’, as contrasted with the word ‘shall’ in the 
same Article, is that the two types of control referred to expressly in Article 290(2) 
are not the only types of control which the legislators can impose.  This also follows 
from the context of Article 290: since the legislators decide whether or not to 
delegate their legislative power, it must follow that they have the power to decide on 
the conditions which apply when they delegate it, provided that the conditions are 
explicit and that the limits in Article 290(1) (and the basic distinction between Articles 
290 and 291, ie control can only be exercised by the EP and/or the Council) are 
complied with.  It might even be argued that the final sentence of Article 290(2), 
which provides that the EP and Council ‘shall’ apply particular voting rules, need not 
always apply either, since that sentence refers back to provisions which are 
themselves only options.  
 
This discussion is relevant because the EP and Council might well wish to develop 
other forms of control besides those listed in Article 290(2).  In particular, the Council 
has already adopted a Regulation pursuant to a special legislative procedure which 
provides powers of control over delegated acts only for itself, and not for the EP.121  
This could only legally be justified if the list of control mechanisms in Article 290(2) is 
non-exhaustive, and in that case it must follow that other types of alternative control 
mechanisms are possible too.  From the point of view of accountability, limiting 
control powers to the Council is acceptable where the Council alone is conferring the 
power on the Commission, but arguably, since Article 290(2) is non-exhaustive, it 
remains an option: the Council might equally chose to share that power jointly with 
the EP if it wishes.  The latter argument is stronger where the EP has the power of 
consent as regards Council legislation adopted by means of a special legislative 
procedure. 
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 See Commission doc. COM (2009) 673, op cit n 110 supra, and EP resolution, op cit n 109 supra; 
Craig, op cit n 112 supra; Driessen, op cit n 62 supra; D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European 
Union: Law, Practices, and the Living Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 123. 
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 Reg 973/2010, [2010] OJ L285/4, Arts 6-10.  There are further proposals to this end: see, for 
instance, the proposal for a Common Consolidated Tax Base (COM (2011) 121, 16 Mar 2011), Arts 
127-130. 
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Finally, the relevance of the pre-Lisbon case law concerning the conferral of 
implementing powers must be re-assessed in light of the new regime established by 
the Treaty of Lisbon.  Presumably, after that Treaty, it is a fortiori still impermissible 
for the Council to confer secondary legislative powers upon itself to amend 
legislation; it can only confer power on itself to adopt implementing acts if the 
conditions to do so are met (subject now to its inability to confer powers on itself to 
the extent that Article 290 applies) or use the relevant legislative procedure.122  If the 
Council had the power to confer such powers upon itself, it would subvert the intent 
of the Treaty drafters as regards both Article 290 (delegated power conferred on the 
Commission only, subject to control by the legislators) and Article 291 (implementing 
power conferred on the Commission, subject to control by the Member States, or 
conferred on the Council only as a ‘duly justified’ exception).  
 
As for the case law regarding the extent of the Council’s power to confer 
implementing powers on itself,123 it is prima facie still valid,124 with the caveat that, for 
the reasons explained above, the Council cannot now confer any powers falling 
within the scope of Article 290 upon itself.   
 
On the other hand, the prior case law on the choice of committee procedure in the 
context of comitology focused on the choice between the management procedure 
and the regulatory procedure.125  Since those procedures have been merged into a 
new ‘examination procedure’, this case law is not relevant as such, except perhaps 
to the extent that it sheds light on the definition of measures of ‘general scope’.  
Furthermore, that case law is not relevant by analogy to the choice in the new 
Implementing Acts Regulation as to whether to require the Member States’ 
representatives to vote by QMV to approve the possible adoption of an implementing 
act by the Commission,  Although this choice resembles the choice between the 
management and the regulatory procedure, the Implementing Acts Regulation, 
unlike the prior comitology decision, does not set out any criteria regarding this 
choice, and so the use of either option is purely a matter of political discretion.126   
 
It is also doubtful whether the prior case law on the choice of committee procedure is 
relevant by analogy as regards the choice between the advisory procedure and the 
examination procedure in the Implementing Acts Regulation, given that the prior 
comitology Decision used the words ‘should’ and ‘guided by’ as regards the choice of 
procedure, and stated expressly in the preamble that the criteria were ‘non-binding’, 
whereas the Implementing Acts Regulation states that each type of procedure 
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 See Case C-133/06, EP v Council [2008] ECR I-3189.  On this issue, see H. Hofmann, 
‘Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbonμ Typology Meets Reality’, 
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 482 at 495-496. 
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 See particularly Cases 16/88, Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457 and C-257/01, Commission 
v Council [2005] ECR I-345.  
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 Although the words ‘duly justified’ have been added to Art 291 TFEU, it is doubtful that they add 
anything to the prior case law on this issue: see Case C-257/01 (ibid), paras. 50 and 51.  However, 
see the view of the Advocate-General in that case (at n 35) that the wording of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty (which is identical to Art 291 TFEU on this point) is ‘a little more specific’.  
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 Cases C-378/00, Commission v EP and Council [2003] ECR I-937, C-122/04, Commission v EP 
and Council [2006] ECR I-2001 and C-443/05, P Common Market Fertilizers v Commission [2007] 
ECR I-209. 
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 See further IV.C below. 
22 
 
‘applies’ in certain cases, but permits the advisory procedure to be applied in ‘duly 
justified cases’.127  The words ‘duly justified’ suggest rather that the prior case law on 
conferring implementing powers on the Council should apply by analogy. 
 
As to the dividing line between Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, there is no case law to 
date on the distinction between measures covered by RPS and measures subject to 
other forms of comitology procedure.128  Given the similarity between the scope of 
RPS and the scope of Article 290 TFEU, any future case law on the RPS/regulatory 
procedure distinction would be relevant to the Article 290/291 distinction – and vice 
versa.   
 
It must be presumed that Article 291, in accordance with prior case law, still permits 
implementing powers to be conferred only as regards non-essential elements of the 
basic acts.  This rule appears expressly in Article 290.  Logically, the obligation to set 
out the essential elements in the basic acts must be interpreted the same way as 
regards Articles 290 and 291, and there is no reason to doubt that the prior case law 
of the Court of Justice remains relevant on this point.129  Similarly, the prior case law 
on the illegality of ultra vires implementing acts of the Commission or Council should 
also be applicable by analogy to measures adopted in the post-Lisbon framework, 
taking account of the specific powers conferred by each basic act.130 
 
Equally, the case law relating to the observance of procedural requirements as 
regards comitology committees is applicable mutatis mutandis to the procedural 
rules established by the Implementing Acts Regulation, and (with greater degrees of 
adaptation) to the control procedures established as regard delegated acts.131 
 
Finally, the concept of ‘implementation’ for the purpose of Article 291 must 
necessarily be narrower than the broad concept of implementation as regards the 
previous Article 202 EC,132 for the obvious reason that, as already discussed, the 
measures now known as delegated acts within the scope of Article 290 previously 
fell within the scope of the prior Article 202 EC as implementing measures, but now 
Articles 290 and 291 are mutually exclusive.   
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 Art 2(2) and (3), op cit n 1 supra.  However, note the word ‘should’ in points 11 and 15 of the 
preamble. 
128
 However, the case law on the definition of ‘general scope’ (op cit n 125 supra) might be partly 
relevant by analogy. 
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 See Cases C-156/93, EP v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019 and C-417/93, EP v Council [1995] 
ECR I-1185. 
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I-795; C-303/94, EP v Council [1996] ECR I-2943; C-159/96, Portugal v Commission [1998] ECR I-
7379; C-93/00, EP v Council [2001] ECR I-10119; C-403/05, EP v Commission [2007] ECR I-9045; C-
14/06 and C-295/06, EP v Commission [2008] ECR I-1649; and C-355/10, EP v Council, pending. 
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 See Case C-263/95, Germany v Commission [1998] ECR I-441 and Joined Cases C-465/02 and 
C-466/02, Germany and Denmark v Commission [2005] ECR I-9115.  As regards the advisory 
procedure, see Case C-86/03, Greece v Commission [2005] ECR I-10979.   
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 Case 16/88, op cit n 123 supra; Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3457, para. 11; Case C-25/70, 
Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle Getreide v Koster [1970] ECR 1161; Case C- 240/90, Germany v 
Commission [1992] ECR I-5383; see also the discussion of the extensive prior case law in Hofmann, 
op cit n 122 supra at 490-491 and Driessen, op cit n 62 supra at 846-847. 
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It has been suggested that Article 291 is also narrower than the prior Article 202 EC 
in that the former Article can only apply where ‘uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed,’ whereas no such condition previously applied.  
In particular, it has been argued that unlike Article 202 EC, Article 291 cannot be 
used to adopt individual decisions, and potentially could not be used as regards 
measures implementing Directives or Regulations.133  However, as can be seen from 
the case law of the Court of Justice, it is indeed possible, particularly in the context of 
market regulation, that an implementing measure concerning (for instance) the 
marketing, restriction or prohibition of an individual substance or product can 
constitute a ‘uniform condition’ for implementing EU law;134  it should not matter 
whether the basic act is a Directive or a Regulation in that case. 135   This 
interpretation is confirmed by the overall legal context: since the limitation to 
measures of ‘general scope’ appears in Article 290 but not Article 291, it follows a 
contrario that Article 291 can cover individual measures, provided that the ‘uniform 
conditions’ criterion is satisfied.  The inclusion of individual acts within the scope of 
the Implementing Acts Regulation is therefore valid.136   
    
B Delegated Acts (Article 290 TFEU) 
 
    
 
 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, contrary to the prior situation under the EC Treaty, introduced 
a hierarchy of legal norms.  By doing so, the Treaty made a distinction between 
legislative and non-legislative acts.  Before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, it was a very difficult and time consuming task, especially for the general 
public, to ascertain whether regulations, directives and decisions came from the EU 
legislative or executive power; this reflected the overall lack of transparency of EU 
decision-making.  The EU’s legal order has now been clarified with the introduction 
of a hierarchy of legal norms and citizens can now easily, in principle, differentiate 
between legislative and non-legislative acts.  In the interests of transparency, Articles 
290(3) and 291(4) TFEU provide respectively that the adjectives ‘delegated’ and 
‘implementing’ shall be inserted in the title of the acts.  Unfortunately, the 
Commission has frequently failed to indicate since the Treaty of Lisbon in the titles of 
its acts under which category the act falls, even following the entry into force of the 
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Implementing Acts Regulation.137  Such instances are very disappointing, especially 
from a transparency perspective, since they ignore significant achievements made 
by the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
The EP’s power to block delegated acts is not new as such,138 since it had the power 
to block the adoption of implementing measures pursuant to the RPS rules.  
However, as compared to the RPS, Article 290 TFEU grants control powers jointly to 
both arms of the EU legislator; so ‘[t]he EP has achieved its historical maturity being 
placed on the same footing as Council’.139  As noted above, while the EP and the 
Council were in many respects in an equal position as regards the RPS, this was not 
the case where the adoption of a draft measure was blocked by a committee, since 
in that case the Council had a first possibility to decide if it wished to adopt or reject 
the draft measure, and if it wished to reject that draft measure, it could do so on any 
grounds – whereas the EP was still limited to certain grounds of rejection.  Under the 
delegated acts procedure, such a distinction cannot arise, since there are no 
committees with powers to block draft delegated acts in the first place.  The EP’s 
historic concerns about the EU’s democratic deficit, which were obviously connected 
with the limited parliamentary influence over comitology measures as compared to 
the Council’s dominant role, seem now to be alleviated. This is impressive, at least in 
theory.  However, as noted above, under the special legislative procedure the EP is 
not in an equal position with the Council as regards delegated acts.   
 
More broadly, the Council and the EP each have more power than under the RPS 
procedure in that they are not now limited to blocking the draft measure only on 
specified grounds, and can exercise ex post control simply ‘… should the measure 
not be to the liking of the EP or the Council’,140 although the possible grounds for 
blocking a measure under the RPS were in principle quite broad.  Also, for the first 
time, either legislator may revoke the powers of delegation granted to the 
Commission.  However, the power to revoke a delegation of power is not as 
fundamentally important as it might appear,141 since in the absence of this power, it 
would always be open to the EP or the Council to reject every proposed delegated 
act submitted by the Commission as regards some (or all) legislative acts.  It would 
equally be possible for one or both of the EP and the Council to reject all draft 
implementing measures pursuant to the RPS procedure, except that one or both 
arms of the legislator would have to justify its rejection in each case on the grounds 
set out in the previous comitology decision.  
 
The bigger difference between the RPS and the delegated acts procedure is, as 
discussed already, the abolition of the formal powers of comitology committees.  
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 For recent examples, see Commission Implementing Reg 297/2011 ([2011] OJ L80/5) and, on the 
other hand, Commission Decision on the approval of national measures for preventing the 
introduction of ostreid herpesvirus 1 ȝȞar (OsHV-1 ȝȞar) into certain areas of Ireland and the UK 
([2011] OJ L80/15).   
138
 See the contrary view of P. Craig, op cit n 112 supra, at 115 stating that the EP has gained an 
‘important power…that it did not have hitherto’. 
139
 European Parliament Press Release available at: 
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Also, the rules for adopting delegated acts are now agreed on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than pursuant to the basic framework for implementing measures, which is 
now set by the EP and the Council acting together under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, and was previously decided by means of unanimity in the Council with 
consultation of the EP.   
 
The implications of the new procedure can only be fully understood in light of the 
institutional practice to date, as regards conferring the power to adopt delegated acts 
and as regards the Commission’s use of that power.  Shortly after the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force, the Commission and the EP stated general positions as 
regards the interpretation of Article 290.142  In particular, the Commission argued that 
the legislators did not have to use both of the control mechanisms listed in Article 
290(2) and should normally grant an indefinite delegation, with a maximum three-
month period for review of draft delegated acts (a two-month period with a possible 
one-month extension).  It also suggested model clauses regarding delegated acts for 
adoption by the legislature, including a provision for a possible urgency procedure.  
For its part, the EP took the view that the mechanisms of control listed in Article 290 
were not exhaustive, and could for instance also include a requirement of a positive 
vote in favour by the EP or the Council before a delegated act could be adopted, or 
the power to revoke delegated acts after adoption.    
 
To date, the EU institutions have not agreed standard rules on use of the delegated 
acts procedure, although it is understood that a ‘common understanding’ on this 
issue is under negotiation.143  So for now, it is necessary to examine each individual 
legislative act.  First of all, one Regulation adopted pursuant to a special legislative 
procedure has conferred the power to adopt delegated acts on the Commission; this 
measure is discussed separately below.  Secondly, 27 legislative acts adopted 
pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure have conferred such powers.144  The 
relevant provisions in the first such measure, a Regulation amending existing EU 
legislation on the movement of pets,145 are similar to the model clauses suggested 
by the Commission, and have in practice been used as a template for all subsequent 
measures.  These provisions are as follows:  
 
Article 19b 
 
1. The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 5(1) and Article 19a 
shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 5 years following 18 June 2010.  
The Commission shall make a report in respect of the delegated powers not later than 
6 months before the end of the 5 year period. The delegation of powers shall be 
automatically extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European 
Parliament or the Council revokes it in accordance with Article 19c. 
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 For instance, see the draft Garcia-Perez report of 25 Mar 2011, on the proposal to amend Council 
Reg 1234/2007 as regards marketing standards.  
144
 The following summary takes account of all adopted legislative acts listed in the Council’s register 
of documents which refer to ‘Article 290’, as of 4 April 2011.  It does not take account of legislative 
acts which have not yet been formally adopted, even where the legislation has been agreed in 
principle.  
145
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2. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously 
to the European Parliament and to the Council. 
 
3. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the 
conditions laid down in Articles 19c and 19d. 
 
Article 19c 
 
1. The delegation of powers referred to in Article 5(1) and Article 19a may be revoked 
at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. 
 
2. The institution which has commenced an internal procedure for deciding whether to 
revoke the delegation of powers shall endeavour to inform the other institution and the 
Commission within a reasonable time before the final decision is taken, indicating the 
delegated powers which could be subject to revocation and possible reasons for a 
revocation. 
 
3. The decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the powers specified 
in that decision. It shall take effect immediately or at a later date specified therein. It 
shall not affect the validity of the delegated acts already in force. It shall be published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
Article 19d 
 
1. The European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act within a 
period of two months from the date of notification. 
 
At the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council this period shall be extended 
by two months. 
 
2. If, on expiry of that period, neither the European Parliament nor the Council has 
objected to the delegated act, it shall be published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union and shall enter into force on the date stated therein. 
 
The delegated act may be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and 
enter into force before the expiry of that period if the European Parliament and the 
Council have both informed the Commission of their intention not to raise objections. 
 
3. If the European Parliament or the Council objects to a delegated act, it shall not 
enter into force. The institution which objects shall state the reasons for objecting to 
the delegated act. 
 
There have been variations upon the first standard provision (as regards the time 
periods for review of the delegation) and upon the third standard provision (as 
regards the time period to object to the draft delegated acts), but there has been no 
variation to date as regards the second standard provision (the possibility of revoking 
the delegation).   
 
In particular: 
a) EU financial legislation (consisting of six adopted measures) consistently 
provides for a (renewable) four-year delegation of power to the Commission, 
27 
 
and a period of three months (which can be extended for a further three 
months) to review the draft acts concerned;146  
b) two measures provide for an indefinite delegation of power to the 
Commission,147 although of course this delegation remains subject to possible 
revocation; 
c) three measures provide for termination of the delegation (as regards one 
type of delegation) by a fixed date;148  
d) two measures provide for longer renewable delegation periods;149  
e) one measure provides for a shorter renewable delegation period;150 and 
f) one measure provides for a three month period (which can be extended for 
a further three months) to review the draft acts concerned.151 
 
In four financial services measures,152 there is a special rule providing for a detailed 
procedure for draft delegated acts to be drawn up in the first place by a specialised 
agency.  If the Commission agrees with such draft acts, there is only a one-month 
period for the EP and Council to review them, with a possible one-month extension.  
Furthermore, in one case to date, the legislative act has included an urgency clause, 
which reads as follows:153  
 
1. Delegated acts adopted under the urgency procedure shall enter into force without 
delay and apply as long as no objection is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. 
The notification of the act to the European Parliament and to the Council shall state the 
reasons for the use of the urgency procedure. 
 
2. The European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 27(1). In such a case, the act shall 
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cease to be applicable. The institution which objects shall state the reasons for 
objecting to the delegated act. 
 
This clause was accompanied by the following Commission statement:  
 
The European Commission undertakes to keep the European Parliament and the 
Council fully informed on the possibility of a delegated act being adopted under the 
urgency procedure. As soon as the Commission's services foresee that a delegated 
act might be adopted under the urgency procedure, they will informally warn the 
secretariats of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
 
Compared to the urgency procedure provided for under the RPS,154  there is of 
course no prior scrutiny by a committee of Member States’ representatives and no 
restriction of the grounds for objecting to the act; also, there is no special time limit of 
one month for review by the legislators and no possibility for the Commission to keep 
the act in force despite their objections.  
 
On the other hand, ten legislative acts to date have provided for the standard 
delegation clauses with no variation.155  Each legislative act has also referred in the 
preamble to the importance of Commission consultations, ‘including at expert level’, 
when preparing draft delegated acts;156 the Commission has also frequently released 
statements promising to take into account the winter, summer and election recesses 
of the other institutions when the latter exercise their prerogatives.  
 
In spite of the Commission’s suggestions, the legislature has never to date waived 
the possibility of subjecting the Commission to both forms of control listed in Article 
290(2)ν but in spite of the EP’s view, nor has the legislature yet subjected the 
Commission to forms of control not listed in Article 290(2).  The time periods for 
review of draft acts are generally longer than the Commission wanted,157 and the 
grant of delegated powers for indefinite periods is quite rare, contrary to the 
Commission’s wishes.  But it should be noted that where the Commission has to 
report on the delegation of power, it will apparently only have to produce one such 
report, on the occasion of the first renewal of the delegation.    
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As for the sole act to date adopted pursuant to a special legislative procedure that 
provided for a delegated acts procedure,158 the relevant rules follow the standard 
template set out above, except that powers are conferred on the Commission for an 
indeterminate period, there is a single period of three months to object to the 
delegated act and most fundamentally, only the Council can exercise the objection 
and revocation powers.  The EP only has the right to be informed of the adoption of 
delegated acts, and of objections and revocations by the Council; it is not even 
accorded the right to make a non-binding objection.   
 
In practice, the Commission has adopted four delegated acts to date, all of which 
concern energy labelling for household products.159  All were approved by the EP 
and Council.  When drawing up its proposals, the Commission consulted Member 
States’ experts and stakeholders widely, and took considerable account of the 
comments and objections expressed.160 
 
Is the delegated acts procedure sufficiently accountable to the Council and the EP?  
First of all, it is not objectionable to confer an indeterminate delegation of power to 
the Commission, as long as the legislators can hold the Commission accountable by 
choosing at any time to revoke that delegation and/or block all individual delegated 
acts.  It might also be argued that it is a waste of the Commission’s time to produce  
a large number of reports on the exercise of the power of delegation in respect of 
some (but not all) individual legislative acts; a single comprehensive annual report on 
the exercise of all the delegated powers should be sufficient to inform the legislators.   
 
As for the process of ensuring accountability for specific delegated acts, both the 
Council and the EP have lost the flow of detailed information that was previously 
generated in the context of comitology committees, and which was necessary to 
ensure effective control of the Commission’s powers.  Craig has moreover argued 
that the removal of comitology committees will have the effect of depriving the 
Commission of the expertise required to regulate highly complicated issues.161   
 
In practice, the Commission’s communication on the delegated acts procedure 
promised to consult national experts systematically, and to ‘conduct any research, 
analysis, hearings and consultations required’ on draft delegated acts.162  As we 
have seen, the legislation providing for the delegated acts procedure refers 
consistently to the consultation of experts, and the Commission took account of 
expert views and the views of wider stakeholders as regards its first delegated acts.  
It follows that, with the replacement of comitology committees and the generalisation 
of the use of expert groups as regards the delegated acts procedure, the latter 
groups are now crucial as conduits of expertise for the Commission and (indirectly) 
as sources of information for the EP and the Council, when holding the Commission 
accountable.  The same applies as regards the accountability of the delegated acts 
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procedure to the public – although the Commission made no mention of this issue in 
its communication.   
 
We must therefore necessarily now turn to the framework for the accountability of 
these expert groups.  Expert groups have been defined as ‘a committee or group set 
up by and terminated by the Commission of its own accord or a committee/group 
that is regarded to be the Commission’s expert group although not financed, chaired 
or set up by the Commission’.163  They consist of ‘… national and/or private-sector 
experts who assist the Commission in exercising its powers of initiative and in its 
tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the Member States’.164   
 
Legally, expert groups constitute a forum for discussion and advice acting under the 
supervision of the Commission.165  Expert groups, as compared to Council working 
groups and the pre-Lisbon comitology committees, have more discretion in the 
relevant policy field in the sense that they do not represent anyone and they do not 
attend any meetings with a mandate on how to act.166  This is because the members 
of the groups are expected to behave independently, guided by their scientific 
knowledge and expertise.  They do not vote in any formal sense. 
 
These groups play a significant role in the EU decision-making process, ‘… 
outnumbering by far other types of committees in the EU system’.167  Acting behind 
the scenes, right after the Commission decides to regulate an area, an expert group 
is created to assist with the drafting of the text.  Although they only have an advisory 
role, expert groups contribute to the drafting of EU measures by providing the 
essential scientific knowledge and expertise required for preparing the Commission’s 
proposals.  
 
Accountability deficits in the field of the expert groups exist due to the lack of 
transparency regarding their exact number, composition and meetings.  ‘[T]here is 
no official list of who participates in what expert group, what time perspective a group 
has, or what kind of budget has been allocated’.168  According to Dehousse, ‘[w]ho 
can say with exactitude the number of committees of experts in existence at the 
European level? Who can vaunt their knowledge of the rules which govern their 
composition and mode of functioning?  At best, a handful of people’. 169  
Disappointingly, not even the Commission has adequate knowledge of the scale and 
activities of the expert groups. 170   Limited transparency of the expert groups 
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contributes to the democratic deficit, since ‘they are born and multiply unrestrained 
by internal regulation and operate unrestricted by standard rules of procedure’.171   
 
The Commission has an online register of expert groups, operating since 2005,172 
but this appears to be seriously incomplete and outdated, since some of the listed 
groups do not actually exist, and some groups which do exist are not listed on the 
register.  There are also gaps in the information available about the background of 
the experts, and there have been serious allegations of a systematic corporate bias 
in the membership of the groups.173  Although there is a requirement for an annual 
report on each group, this can be replaced by a link to a relevant website, and some 
of these links are inoperative.  As compared to comitology committees, the register 
does not list the meetings and documents considered by the expert groups.  More 
broadly, the absence of standard rules governing the delegated acts procedure also 
means that there are no specific rules on accountability of that procedure to the 
public.  This lack of transparency is unacceptable now that these groups are to be 
the key mechanism for scrutiny of draft delegated measures.  The public cannot 
exercise sufficient control through the access to documents rules174 if the available 
information through the register is not updated.175  
 
Although the EP and Commission have already agreed, in the Framework 
Agreement on their relations, that the Commission will give the EP ‘full information 
and documentation on its meetings with national experts within the framework of its 
work on the preparation and implementation’ of EU law, including delegated acts,176  
it is not enough for the expert groups to be accountable to the EP; accountability to 
the Council and the public should be ensured as well.   
 
At the very least, these groups need to be governed by rules equivalent to those 
governing comitology committees, which would entail, at least as far as delegated 
acts are concerned, the complete publication of a list of the groups, the agendas of 
their meetings, the summary records of meetings, the background of their members, 
the draft and final acts, statistical data on the functioning of the groups and an 
annual report on their work.177  As noted above, however, the application of these 
rules has anyway been disappointing in practice as regards comitology 
committees.178  In any event, since the delegated acts procedure will take over from 
the RPS procedure, which is covered by the binding rules in question, the net effect 
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of creating the delegated acts procedure is to reduce the standards for public 
accountability that previously applied. 
 
 
 
 
C Implementing Acts (Article 291 TFEU) 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Soon after the entry into force of the new Treaty, the Commission made a legislative 
proposal179  for the implementation of Article 291 TFEU.  Following negotiations 
between the EP and the Council on the Commission’s proposal, these institutions 
reached a ‘first-reading’ deal which was supported by the EP plenary in December 
2010.  The new Implementing Acts Regulation was formally adopted in February 
2011, and the Regulation came into force on 1 March 2011.180  The Regulation lays 
down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by 
Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers.   
 
Compared to the prior rules, and the Commission’s proposal, the Regulation now 
provides for an advisory procedure (as before), 181  plus also an examination 
procedure (which replaces the prior regulatory and management procedures).182  
The rules on the choice of committee procedure have been amended.183  Under the 
examination procedure, normally a QMV of Member States’ representatives will be 
needed to block a draft measure (as in the previous management committee 
system).184  If there is a positive vote the Commission must adopt the measure,185 
and if there is no opinion, the Commission may adopt it, subject to three exceptions:  
where the act concerns four sensitive subjects (taxation, financial services, the 
protection of health or safety of humans, animals or plants or safeguard measures); 
where the basic act requires a QMV of representatives in favour; or where a simple 
majority opposes the draft measure. 186   Crucially, the Regulation specifies that 
existing management procedures were automatically converted to the new system 
without the foregoing exceptions applying, while the existing regulatory procedures 
were automatically converted to the new system with the proviso that a QMV of 
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Member States’ representatives is still necessary to approve a draft measure.187  
Also, as noted above,188 the RPS remains in force on a transitional basis.  The final 
Regulation therefore retains rather more power for the Member States’ 
representatives than the Commission had proposed.189   
 
In place of an appeal to the Council in the event that a draft implementing measure is 
blocked by Member States’ representatives, the Regulation provides for an ‘appeal 
committee’ of Member States’ representatives, which, like the Council in the previous 
rules, can usually block the draft measure only by a QMV against it.190  Contrary to 
the previous rules, the Commission is not obliged to make a proposal to the appeal 
committee in this case; it can instead submit a revised proposal to the original 
committee, or drop the proposed measure.  Equally the Commission is no longer 
obliged to adopt the measure concerned, if the appeal committee (as compared to 
the Council, in the previous rules) does not adopt an opinion.  Also, the measure 
concerned can now formally only be adopted by the Commission, not the Council (or 
the appeal committee).  The Commission normally has one month to submit the draft 
measure to the appeal committee, or two months to submit a new version of the draft 
measure to the comitology committee.191  The appeal committee must normally vote 
within two months, as opposed to the prior rule of a maximum three months for the 
Council to act.192  
 
There are two forms of derogation from the basic rules in the Regulation.  First of all, 
the Commission can adopt implementing measures in spite of a committee vote 
blocking them, if the non-adoption of the measure would create ‘a significant 
disruption of [agricultural] markets or a risk for the financial interests of the Union’.  
The appeal committee can overturn the Commission’s decision by QMV.193 This 
procedure is a continuation of the previous possibility for the Commission to adopt a 
draft measure on an interim basis, despite a negative committee vote, while waiting 
for a Council decision, pursuant to the prior management procedure.194   
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Secondly, the Regulation provides for the Commission to adopt immediately 
applicable measures, bypassing the committees’ involvement (Article 8 of the 
Regulation) only if the basic act provides, subject to a time limit of six months (unless 
the basic act provides otherwise) and an urgency requirement, and subject to repeal 
if an examination committee delivers a negative vote.195      This procedure replaces 
the prior safeguard procedure, which had also permitted the Commission to act 
without prior committee control, subject to a Member State appealing the measure 
concerned to the Council, which could block, approve or take a different view by 
QMV; it was even possible for a basic act to provide for revocation of a Commission 
decision, if the Council had not taken a decision.196 The previous rules had not set 
any time limits for safeguard measures.  
 
How accountable is the new system to the Member States and the Council?  The 
latter institution has been removed from the comitology procedure entirely (leaving 
aside RPS), but it instead has gained a ‘right of scrutiny’, on the same footing as the 
EP, to object to the Commission where, in its view, a draft implementing act exceeds 
the powers conferred by the basic act, if the basic act was adopted pursuant to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.  But the Commission is not required to act if the 
Council objects to the draft implementing act.197 The Council also has a new right to 
information on committee proceedings, again on the same footing as the EP.198   
 
As for accountability to Member States as such, the prior status quo has largely been 
preserved on a transitional basis, since the voting rules relating to the former 
regulatory and management procedures have been retained for the time being, and 
the new appeal committee is largely subject to the same voting rules as the Council 
previously was.  The impact of the Regulation in practice will therefore depend (as 
regards previous management committees) upon the rate at which pre-existing 
comitology provisions are amended, and (as regards previous regulatory 
procedures) on whether new or amended measures take up the option to require a 
QMV of representatives in favour to approve a draft measure.  It might be expected 
that the Commission will rarely, if ever, propose use of this option, while the Council 
might often be in favour of it, but the EP will be indifferent since its prerogatives are 
not affected by this choice.  In practice, the only relevant basic act adopted (at time 
of writing) since the Implementing Acts Regulation came into force does not provide 
for this option.199  It is odd to provide for a requirement of QMV or a simple majority 
of Member States’ representatives in favour for some implementing measures to be 
adopted, whereas the voting rule for the Council to block the adoption of delegated 
acts is QMV against.200 
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As for the European Parliament, the Implementing Acts Regulation, as already 
noted, preserves its pre-existing right of scrutiny, permitting it to object (without 
binding effect) to the Commission where it believes that a draft implementing act is 
ultra vires a basic act adopted pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure.201  Of 
course, this power is now broader in scope, simply because the scope of the 
ordinary legislative procedure has been widened considerably by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  It is not clear whether this right would apply though if the basic act was 
adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon at a time when the co-
decision procedure was not applicable to the area concerned, even if the ordinary 
legislative procedure would now apply to the basic act in question if it had been 
adopted after the entry into force of that Treaty.  In addition, the EP and the Council 
are apparently empowered to question the legality of any type of implementing act 
on ultra vires grounds.202  However, the EP has lost its prior right to complain to the 
Council regarding an allegedly ultra vires measure where the Council was 
considering a draft of that measure,203 without a replacement right to raise such a 
complaint before the appeal committee established by the new Regulation.  
 
The EP has the right to information about committee proceedings, in that the 
Commission must transfer the agendas, draft acts on which the committees have 
been asked to deliver an opinion and the final draft acts at the same time as those 
documents are sent to committee members. 204   The EP also has a right to 
information ‘in accordance with the applicable rules’ on the list of committees, 
summary records of committee work (including information on the background of 
representatives), voting results, adoption of final implementing measures and 
statistical information.205  Compared to the prior rules, the right to information now 
includes statistical data and material on final implementing acts, and the EP will now 
receive information on all draft implementing measures, not just on those measures 
implementing basic acts adopted by means of the co-decision procedure.206   
 
While the EP therefore has an increased right to information as regards committee 
proceedings and arguably an increased right of scrutiny, it has not been given any 
control powers (leaving aside the pre-existing RPS).  But it is impossible to give such 
powers to the EP (or the Council), due to the fundamental distinction in Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU between the role of the EU legislators and the role of the Member 
States.207  
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As for accountability to the public, unfortunately, the Implementing Acts Regulation 
does not provide for enhanced transparency rights at all, because there is still no 
obligation to make any information on committee proceedings, as distinct from 
references to documents in the comitology register, directly available to the public.208  
Although the information referred to in the register now includes statistical data, 
information on final implementing acts and all draft acts (not just draft acts 
implementing a basic act adopted by means of the co-decision procedure), the fact 
remains that this information need only be listed in the register, not available directly.  
It is ironic that the Commission defines full transparency only with reference to the 
Council and the EP and not the general public.  By doing so, it defeats the very 
purpose of transparency, which is namely for the public to hold decision-makers to 
account.209   The adoption of the Implementing Acts Regulation was therefore a 
missed opportunity to improve the standards of transparency in this area.210   
 
Moreover, comitology meetings will continue to take place behind closed doors.  The 
EP did not even try opening committee doors.  In order to enhance democratic 
accountability, a selected public could be allowed to attend comitology meetings 
and/or these meetings could be broadcast.  Another option could be a notice and 
comment procedure so the interested groups and the members of the general public 
could make their views known to these committees.211  In this way, political control of 
comitology can be exercised by ‘alternative technical experts and a technical partial 
public’212 who could then liaise with MEPs in such a way as to perform a ‘fire alarm’ 
function.  For the practical political process, this would imply that MEPs would be 
informed whenever issues of great political sensitivity come up and the EP could 
thus resort to its control functions under comitology.   
 
The EP proposed to solve this problem by arguing during the negotiations of the 
second comitology Decision 213  that MEPs themselves should attend comitology 
committee meetings rather than having to rely on external actors.  This view was 
rejected by the Commission and the Council on the basis that enhanced information 
rights of the EP and the public might solve the problem,214 but as discussed already, 
previous experience revealed that this is not sufficient to remedy the accountability 
deficit. 
 
 
V Conclusion: More accountability of the committee-based system after the 
Treaty of Lisbon? 
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The Lisbon Treaty attempted to rectify the accountability inadequacies of the 
comitology committees, by replacing them with a two-part framework with 
conceptually different types of control procedures.  The Treaty provides for sufficient 
possibilities in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU to establish an adequate accountability 
framework as regards the exercise of the delegated and implementing acts.  Notably, 
the EP and the Council have the powers to control ex ante and ex post the delegated 
powers of the Commission in relation to delegated acts, while the Member States in 
practice will retain most of their prior powers as regards implementing acts.   
 
It is regrettable, however, that the new procedures are not sufficiently transparent to 
ensure accountability to the public.  In particular, the opportunity to improve 
transparency standards as regards implementing measures has been missed, and 
the standards in relation to delegated acts are lower than those which previously 
applied to RPS, taking into account the absence of binding rules and the 
opaqueness of the Commission’s expert groups. After all, the ultimate accountability 
forum is the general public.  More democratic control through the EP is welcome and 
impressive in theory but in practice, as far the general public is concerned little has 
changed. Citizens need to be aware of what is happening in order to hold the 
Commission and the legislature into account. 
 
 
